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FAIR-VALUE LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO THE
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS OF SOLD-OUT
JUNIOR LIENHOLDERS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS'
APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE SECTION 580a

I.

INTRODUCTION

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 580a' was once considered the dormant antideficiency statute.2 Born of the Great Depression,
section 580a was virtually obsolete from 1939 until 1981.' Revitalized,
however, this statute has become a formidable weapon in the hands of
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989). Section 580a provides in pertinent
part:
Whenever a money judgment is sought for the balance due upon an obligation
for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale upon real
property or any interest therein was given as security, following the exercise of the
power of sale in such deed of trust or mortgage, the plaintiff shall set forth in his or
her complaint the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by the deed
of trust or mortgage at the time of sale, the amount for which the real property or
interest therein was sold and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale and the
date of that sale. . . . Before rendering any judgment the court shall find the fair
market value of the real property, or interest therein sold, at the time of sale. The
court may render judgment for not more than the amount by which the entire
amount of the indebtedness due at the time of sale exceeded the fair market value of
the real property or interest therein sold at the time of sale with interest thereon from
the date of the sale; provided, however, that in no event shall the amount of the
judgment, exclusive of interest after the date of sale, exceed the difference between
the amount for which the property was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust or mortgage. Any such action must be brought
within three months of the time of sale under the deed of trust or mortgage. No
judgment shall be rendered in any such action until the real property or interest
therein has first been sold pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust or mortgage,
unless the real property or interest therein has become valueless.
Id.
2. One commentator notes that "[t]he author has found no reported California decisions
applying section 580a as the Legislature intended." Mertens, California'sForeclosureStatutes:
Some Proposalsfor Reform, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 533, 542 (1986); see also Arnold, AntiDeficiency in the Eighties: The "Sanction Aspect, " Fair Value and Where the Action Is (And
Isn't), 5 CAL. REAL PROP. J., Spring 1987, 1, 18 ("However, since the 1939 passage of CCP
§ 580d... Section 580a has been generally irrelevant.").
3. See Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme Court Tries Again, 22
UCLA L. REV. 753, n.1 (1975); Mertens, supra note 2, at 534 & n.10; see also R. BERNHARDT,
CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE § 4.18 (1979 & Supp. 1988); J.
HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS §

6.1 (1970).
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debtors.4 This Comment analyzes the recent application of section 580a

to limit the deficiency judgments of sold-out junior lienholders (SOJLs)
who purchase the real property forming their security at non-judicial
foreclosure sales.'
4. This Comment discusses the ways that debtors use and attempt to use section 580a,
and the courts' willingness to see debtors' perspectives.
5. The reader who is not versed in the language of real estate secured transactions may
find it difficult to consider the provisions of section 580a without first being familiar with some
of the terminology used in this technical area of law. The following hypothetical illustrates
some basic concepts:
Assume debtor (D) purchases commercial property for $100,000. D pays $25,000 in cash
as a down payment, and gives the seller (S) a promissory note for $75,000, putting up the
property as collateral for the loan. S takes back a thirty-year promissory note, and a first trust
deed on the property that evidences S's security interest. (Since S is the first lienholder to
record its security interest on the property, it becomes the "senior lienholder.")
Having purchased the property, D needs to develop the land for business uses. Since D
put all available capital into the down payment, D takes out a construction loan in the amount
of $25,000 from 1st Hypothetical Bank. In exchange for this loan, Ist Hypothetical Bank
takes back a note and a second trust deed (thus, becoming a "junior lienholder" ()). Soon
after construction is completed, D defaults on the note held by S. Pursuant to the note, S
"accelerates" D's obligation (calls the entire debt due immediately), but D is unable to pay.
In order to recover its $75,000 debt, S must foreclose on the property. See Western Fuel
Co. v. Sanford G. Lewald Co., 190 Cal. 25, 210 P. 419 (1922); Barbieri v. Ramelli, 84 Cal. 154,
156, 23 P. 1086, 1087 (1890); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1989). However, the
lienholder has the option of foreclosing "judicially," CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 726, or "nonjudicially" under the "power of sale" clause contained in the trust deed. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2924 (West Supp. 1989) (lienholder's right to foreclose non-judicially under power of sale
and procedures for non-judicial foreclosure). In a judicial foreclosure, S can recover a deficiency judgment against D if the property is sold for less than the amount due on S's note.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1989). However, real property sold pursuant to a
judicial foreclosure is subject to the debtor's statutory right of redemption (in other words,
debtor can buy property back from purchaser at foreclosure sale for certain period of time
following sale). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.010-729.080 (West Supp. 1989) (debtor's postsale statutory right of redemption). After a non-judicial foreclosure sale, there is no statutory
right of redemption, but the selling lienholder cannot sue the debtor for a deficiency if the
property sells for less than the amount due on the note. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West
1976).
Further assume that S forecloses non-judicially, selling the property to J at the foreclosure
sale for $75,000 (the amount of J's debt). Since the property is sold for less than the amount
needed to fully compensate J, J is a "sold-out" junior lienholder (SOJL) (J's lien, being junior
to S's, is extinguished by the foreclosure sale). See infra note 12 and accompanying text,
However, since J is not the selling lienholder, it may sue D for a deficiency judgment. See infra
note 15 and accompanying text. The issue in this Comment is whether D may defend such an
action by arguing that the real property was sold for less than its fair market value, thereby
limiting the deficiency that D will have to pay to J. See Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498
P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972), for a similar fact pattern. The primary difference between the facts in Spangler and the above hypothetical is that the seller in Spangler
"subordinated" (contractually waived her priority) to the construction lender. Id. at 606, 498
P.2d at 1056, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
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The Operation and Effect of Section 580a

Section 580a 6 is an antideficiency statute. When debtors' default on
their obligations to pay lienholders, the lienholders .have the option of
several remedies, including foreclosure of the mortgage or trust deed. 8
After a foreclosure sale, which may be effected judicially or non-judicially,9 one of three situations may exist. First, the amount bid on the
property at the foreclosure sale may be exactly the amount necessary to
extinguish all lienholders' liens. Second, the amount bid may be greater
than the amount necessary to extinguish the lienholders' liens. This is
called a "surplus."'" Finally, the amount bid may be less than the
amount necessary to extinguish the lienholders' liens. This is called a
"deficiency."
Either the selling lienholder" or a junior lienholder may have a deficiency. The selling lienholder's deficiency results from a bid amount that
is less than the amount of its debt. The junior lienholder's deficiency
results from a bid amount that is not great enough to extinguish the debts
of both the selling lienholder and the junior. Thus, after the foreclosure
sale, the junior lienholder's entire debt may remain, or a part of that
debt. However, the foreclosure sale extinguishes all junior liens.12 The
result is that the junior lienholder is "sold-out" by the selling lienholder's
foreclosure, and the property no longer secures the debt of the "sold.out" junior lienholder (SOJL).
A lienholder who has a deficiency after a judicial foreclosure sale
6. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
7. In this Comment, "debtor" will be used synonymously with "mortgagor" and the trustor on a trust deed. "Lienholder" will be used synonymously with "mortgagee" and the beneficiary of a trust deed.
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1989); see Passanisi v. Merit-McBride Realtors, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 1505-06, 236 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62 (1987). Other options include
negotiating a deed in lieu of foreclosure, suing a guarantor on the guarantee or effecting a
"workout." However, under section 726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a creditor
whose debt is secured by real property cannot sue a debtor directly on the note until after a
foreclosure. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1989).
9. A non-judicial foreclosure sale is often referred to as a foreclosure under the
lienholder's "power of sale." "Power of sale" is the terminology used in section 580a. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
10. For the purposes of this Comment, "surplus" refers to any proceeds received for the
property at the foreclosure sale in excess of the amount of the foreclosing lienholder's lien.
Surplus proceeds are distributed first to junior secured creditors and then, if a surplus remains,
to the debtor. See 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE
§ 3:120 (1975).
11. The terms "selling lienholder" and "foreclosing lienholder" are synonymous for the
purposes of this Comment.
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1214 (West 1982); see also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57
Cal. 2d 621, 371 P.2d 578, 21 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1962).
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can sue the debtor directly on the note. 1 3 Prior to 1939,14 the selling
lienholder and SOJL could sue the debtor for deficiencies on the notes
after a non-judicial foreclosure sale as well. 5 Section 580a required the
selling lienholder to sue the debtor for a deficiency judgment within three
months after the foreclosure sale. 16 Moreover, section 580a provided
that the selling lienholder's deficiency would be limited by the "fair market value" of the real property sold at the foreclosure sale. 7 Thus, section 580a operated as an affirmative defense to the selling lienholder's
action for a deficiency judgment on the note.
Section 580a was considered inapplicable to SOJLs.' 8 The plain language of the statute indicates that it applies solely to the selling
lienholder. 19 The statute goes into effect "following the exercise of the
power of sale in such deed of trust or mortgage .
,.2o Only selling
lienholders exercise their powers of sale; the SOJL's lien is extinguished
by the selling lienholder's foreclosure. 2 ' Thus, since SOJLs cannot exercise their powers of sale, the express language of the statute supports the
contention that section 580a was intended only to apply to selling
lienholders after a non-judicial foreclosure.2 2 If the California Legislature had intended this section to limit the deficiency judgments of SOJLs,
it easily could have substituted the language "any deed of trust or mortgage" for "such deed of trust or mortgage." Then, arguably, section
580a could limit a deficiency by any lienholder after the selling
lienholder's non-judicial foreclosure.
Thus, prior to 1939, a debtor could assert section 580a as an affirma13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1989). The lienholder could sue a guarantor on the guarantee if one exists. See, e.g., Everts v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437, 132 P.2d 476
(1943); R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.44. However, the lienholder may not be able to
recover from the guarantor if the guarantor ultimately is liable as a debtor as well. This generally results when a lienholder takes a guarantee from the general partners of a debtor partnership. See Union Bank v. Dorn, 254 Cal. App. 2d 157, 159, 61 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (1967);
Riddle v. Lushing, 203 Cal. App. 2d 831, 836, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904-05 (1962).
14. In 1939, the California Legislature enacted section 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1939 Cal. Stat. 1991 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West
1976)). This section prohibited selling lienholders from seeking a deficiency judgment after
non-judicial foreclosures. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of
section 580d.
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963).
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 19.
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tive defense against a selling lienholder's action for a deficiency judg-

ment, but not against an SOJL. Between 1939 and 1981, section 580a
was essentially dormant.23 The controversy addressed in this Comment,

however, began in 1981 when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the fair-value limitation of section 580a to an SOJL who purchased the
secured property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale (purchasing SOJL).2 4
B.

The Controversy over the Application of Section 580a to Purchasing
Sold-Out Junior Lienholders: Cases and Policies

Originally, the California Supreme Court held that section 580a was

not applicable to SOJLs. In Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino,2 5 the Califor-

nia Supreme Court stated that section 580a was intended to apply only to
selling lienholders.2 6 Moreover, the court found that SOJLs are more like
debtors than selling lienholders because both the SOJLs and the debtors
must invest additional funds to purchase the property at the foreclosure
sale.2 7 In contrast, selling lienholders could purchase the property by
"credit-bidding" against their debts.28 Thus, California law permitted
any SOJL to purchase the property and subsequently sue the debtor for a

deficiency that would not be limited by the fair-value provision of section
580a.29
A subsequent California Court of Appeal case expanded on Roseleaf
23. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 18 ("[S]ince the 1939 passage of CCP § 580d... Section
580a has been generally irrelevant, especially with regard to a defaulting trustor who executed
a note secured by real property."); Mertens, supra note 2, at 534 ("In 1939, however, section
580d was enacted barring all deficiency judgments after a nonjudicial foreclosure, thereby rendering section 580a obsolete."); see also R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.18 ("[T]he enactment of § 580d created a complete bar to any deficiency judgment after a private sale, preempting § 580a in most, if not all, situations.").
24. Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (1981). See infra notes 144-70 and
accompanying text for a detailed analysis of Bank of Hemet.
25. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
26. Id. at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875 ("The purpose of the fair-value limitations in sections 580a and 726 does not extend to sold-out junior lienors.... Fair-value provisions are designed to prevent creditors from buying in at their own sales at deflated prices and
realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for large deficiencies.") (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 39, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875 ("The fair-value limitations of sections
580a and 726 likewise do not apply to a junior lienor..- whose security has been rendered
valueless by a senior sale.").
28. "Credit-bid" refers to foreclosing creditors' right to bid against their debts rather than
pay cash to buy the property at the foreclosure sale. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 6.23.
Non-selling lienholders are not permitted to credit-bid; rather, they must pay cash. Nomellini
Constr. Co. v. Modesto Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 114, 115, 79 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719
(1969); Investcal Realty Corp. v. Edgar H. Mueller Constr. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 190, 197, 55
Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1966).
29. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 39, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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by refusing to apply section 580a to a purchasing SOJL who sought 3a0
deficiency by foreclosing on additional security. In Dickey v. Williams,
the court refused to limit a purchasing SOIL's deficiency even though the
property was purchased at a price well below the fair-market value. The
court reasoned that the purchasing SOJL was taking advantage of an
opportunity which was equally available to any "stranger" at the foreclosure sale.3 1

However, beginning in 1981, the courts perceived a distinction between a purchasing SOIL and a non-purchasing SOL.32 The basis of
this distinction seems to be that, unlike the non-purchasing SOIL, the
33
purchasing SOJL may resell the property later to recover the debt.
Thus, these courts argued that purchasing SOJLs should be precluded
from recovering the difference between the fair value and the amount of
the senior lienholder's debt that the SOIL paid at the sale.3" Based upon
this policy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the fair-value
limitation of section 580a to a purchasing SOIL in Bank of Hemet v.
United States.3 5 Although some question exists as to the legitimacy of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in light of Roseleaf,3 6 the California Court of
Appeal ratified the policies enunciated by the Ninth Circuit's Bank of
Hemet decision in Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham.37
Heller Western is the sole California case to apply section 580a to
purchasing SOJLs. Nonetheless, Heller Western has had a considerable
effect on California real estate secured transactions law.3 8 The Heller
Western court relied on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and thereby vali39
dated Bank of Hemet as a proper interpretation of California law.
30. 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 49 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1966).
31. Id. at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
32. See Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661, 668-69 (1981); Walter E. Heller
Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 272-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428-29 (1985);
see also infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
33. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669.
34. See, e.g., Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669; Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273-74,
221 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
35. 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
36. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
37. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
38. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 18 ("Despite the holding of Roseleaf, Section 580a has
since been deemed to apply on two occasions to a sold-out junior lienor in what might be
colloquially described as the judicial equivalent of resurrection."); see also R. BERNHARDT,

supra note 3, § 4.31 ("[The Bank ofHemet v. United States] approach was then adopted in
California in Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham . .

").

39. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 274, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429 ("To so limit the
deficiency judgment right is consistent with the general purpose of section 580a. . . .") (citing
Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661, 669 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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Although Heller Western was a marked departure from earlier state
court decisions interpreting California secured transactions law," the
California Supreme Court did not review this decision.
The California Supreme Court's failure to settle this matter invited
disagreement in the court of appeal. Just two years after Heller Western,
a court of appeal decided Pacific Loan Management v. Superior Court.41
Pacific Loan Management involved an SOJL who overbid on the property at the foreclosure sale and sought to have the debt satisfied out of the
surplus proceeds.4' The court disagreed with some of the policies enunciated by Heller Western.43 Nonetheless, the Pacific Loan Management
court also appeared to adopt Heller Western in dicta.' Thus, Heller
Western is still the most current statement of California law on the appli-

cation of section 580a to purchasing SOJLs who seek deficiency
judgments.
Currently, Heller Western's application of section 580a limits
purchasing SOJLs' out-of-pocket deficiency judgments after non-judicial
foreclosure sales."a However, Pacific Loan Management permits the
purchasing SOJL to circumvent this problem by either (1) taking security
interests in multiple parcels, thereby giving the purchasing SOIL flexibility of action;4 6 or (2) being over-secured,4 7 thereby increasing the likeli40. See, eg., Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963); Investcal Realty Corp. v. Edgar H. Mueller Constr. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 190, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 475 (1966); Dickey v. Williams, 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 49 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1966).
41. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1987).
42. Id. at 1488, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 548. Surplus proceeds result when the property is sold
for more than the amount of the selling lienholder's lien. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
43. 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1494, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
44. Id. at 1495 & n.3; 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553 & n.3.
45. As used in this Comment, an "out-of-pocket" deficiency is one which the debtor must
pay directly to the creditor (such as a judgment) as distinguished from a recovery out of funds
which the debtor already has made available to the creditor (such as additional collateral) or
which come from the creditor himself (such as when the creditor overbids on the property).
Thus, despite Heller Western and Bank ofHemet, a purchasing SOJL may foreclose on additional security or recover the surplus proceeds from the sale. See Investcal, 247 Cal. App. 2d
at 198-99, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 481; Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 271-72, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
46. See Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 271-72, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31. The SOJL can
purchase the first parcel for less than the fair value and subsequently foreclose on the additional security. Id. If their debts are not satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale, SOJLs can
get a deficiency judgment under the following circumstances: (1) they do not purchase the
second parcel; or (2) they pay the fair value for the second parcel. See, e.g., Investcal, 247 Cal.
App. 2d at 198-99, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 481; Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 271-72, 49 Cal. Rptr. at
530-31.
47. Creditors may be over-secured in one of two ways: (1) they may take a security interest in one parcel of property having an unencumbered value which is greater than the amount
of the debt; or (2) they may take a security interest in multiple parcels of property which have
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hood that the security will be sufficient to satisfy the SOJL's debt.48

This Comment suggests that Bank of Hemet and Heller Western are
based on conclusionary reasoning and result in consequences that harm
the interests of both debtors and lienholders. The Author therefore pro-

poses that section 580a be repealed and, consequently, both purchasing
and non-purchasing SOJLs be permitted to recover full deficiency
judgments.4 9
Part II examines section 580a's context and purpose in the scheme
of California antideficiency legislation. Part III then analyzes the case
law in light of the purpose of the statute and the policies guiding the

decisions of the respective courts. Finally, Part IV raises new policy concerns over the current state of the law in this area.
II.

SECTION 580A IN THE SCHEME OF CALIFORNIA
ANTIDEFICIENCY LEGISLATION

California antideficiency legislation currently consists of four stat-

3
52
51
5°
utes: Code of Civil Procedure sections 580a, 580b, 580d and 726.1

Section 726,11 enacted in 1872,11 is considered to be the "linchpin" of the
a combined unencumbered value greater than the amount of the debt. See, e.g., Investcal, 247
Cal. App. 2d at 198-99, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 481; Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 271-72, 49 Cal. Rptr.
at 530-31.
48. See Hatch v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 19 Cal. 2d 254, 120 P.2d 869 (1942). The court
stated that "[b]y its express terms, [section 580a] is concerned only with actions to recover
deficiency judgments after the security is exhausted .... " Id. at 261, 120 P.2d at 873. The
court held that "since the defendant has at no time attempted to secure a deficiency judgment
against anyone . . section 580a is not applicable. It imposes no requirement which would
invalidate the [sale of the additional security]." Id. at 262, 120 P.2d at 874. Of course, if all of
the SOJL's real property collateral has been exhausted by selling lienholder foreclosures, then
the SOJL can sue for a deficiency judgment. See Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 38, 378 P.2d at 98, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 874; see also Savings Bank v. Central Mkt. Co., 122 Cal. 28, 63 P. 165 (1898).
The purchasing SOJL may be able to protect himself in other ways as well. Currently,
section 580a does not protect guarantors. See Everts v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437, 132 P.2d
476 (1942); Bank of Am. v. Hunter, 8 Cal. 2d 592, 67 P.2d 99 (1937); Mariners Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Neil, 22 Cal. App. 3d 232, 99 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1971); Security-First Nat'l Bank v.
Chapman, 41 Cal. App. 2d 219, 106 P.2d 431 (1940). However, this rule came under attack in
Union Bank v. Gradsky, 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968). See also Mertens, supra
note 2, at 561-69.
49. Section 580b would still create an exception for applicable purchase-money residential
property. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
Id. § 580b (West 1976).
Id. § 580d (West 1976).
Id. § 726 (West Supp. 1989).
Id.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726. It should be noted that section 726's fair-value limita-

tion was not added until 1933. 1933 Cal. Stat. 2118.
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entire scheme.5 6 Section 726 contains two primary subsections. Subsec-

tion 726(a)

7

is called the "one-action statute" because it requires credi-

tors who are secured by mortgages or deeds of trust to extinguish their
security5 8 prior to suing the debtor on the note.59 Subsection 726(b),6"
which goes into effect following a judicial foreclosure, contains a fairvalue limitation 61 and a time limitation for filing an action against the

debtor for a deficiency judgment.62
In 1933, the California Legislature enacted sections 580a6 3 and

580bl as a direct result of the financial harship of the Great Depression.65 The economic realities of the period pushed many debtors into
56. Hetland & Hansen, The "Mixed Collateral".Amendmentsto California's Commercial
Code-CovertRepeal of California'sReal PropertyForeclosureandAntideficiency Provisionsor
Exercise in Futility?, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 195 (1987). In response to this article, see
Hirsch, Arnold, Rabin & Sigman, The U C.C.Mixed CollateralStatute-HasParadiseReally
Been Lost?, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1988).
57. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West Supp. 1989).
58. When a senior lienholder forecloses on property, the junior liens are "extinguished."
See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57 Cal. 2d 621, 371 P.2d 578, 21 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1962).
Thus, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale only takes "subject to" liens senior to the selling
lienholder's. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1214 (West 1982).
59. Barbieri v. Ramelli, 84 Cal. 154, 156, 23 P. 1086, 1087 (1890).
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp. 1989). Subsection 726(b) was enacted in
1933. 1933 Cal. Stat. 2118.
61. Under California case law, fair value is defined as "intrinsic value." Rainer Mortgage
v. Silverwood, Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 366, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1985) ("The 'fair
value' of foreclosed property is thus its intrinsic value. Under normal conditions this intrinsic
value will often coincide with its fair market value; the value a willing purchaser will pay to a
willing seller in an open market.").
62. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West Supp. 1989). Section 580a and subsection
726(b) both contain a fair-value limitation and a time limitation for filing an action against the
debtor for a deficiency judgment. Id. §§ 580a, 726(b) (West Supp. 1989). The primary difference between the corresponding provisions of section 580a and subsection 726(b) is that section 580a applies to non-judicial foreclosures (those which are held under the lienholder's
power of sale), and subsection 726(b) applies to judicial foreclosures (those which are supervised by the court). Thus, cases often discuss these code sections together and analogies between the two sections are easily drawn. See, eg., Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d
35, 39, 378 P.2d 97, 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875 (1963).
63. 1933 Cal. Stat. 1669, 1672 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a
(West Supp. 1989)). This section is similar to subsection 726(b) in that it contains a fair-value
limitation and a time limitation within which a secured creditor must sue on the note for a
deficiency judgment. Id.; see also supra note 62.
64. 1933 Cal. Stat. 1669, 1673 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b
(West 1976)). See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 580b.
65. Hatch v. Security First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 254, 259, 120 P.2d 869,
873 (1942) ("The evil which led to the enactment of this legislation became pronounced during
the recent period of economic depression ....). See also Arnold, supra note 2, at 1 ("Section
580b and the 'fair value' limitations on deficiency judgments imposed by CCP Sections 580a
and 726 were both added in 1933 as a response to the economic chaos of the Depression era.");
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default and caused a general decline in real property values.66 Selling
lienholders could sell property at non-judicial foreclosure sales and

"credit-bid" 67 against their debts for the lowest amount necessary to
purchase the property.6" Consequently, the selling lienholder would own

the property, usually buying it for much less than the debtor owed on the
note.6 9 The lienholder could then sue the debtor for a deficiency judgment. 70 As a result, the debtor would lose the property and still owe the
selling lienholder a substantial amount of money.7 1 Sections 580a and
72
580b were enacted to prevent or mitigate the effect of this practice.

By limiting the purchasing lienholder's deficiency judgment to the
difference between the amount owed on the note and the fair value of the
property, section 580a73 created an incentive for selling lienholders to sell
property for a price reasonably close to the amount of their security interests.74 Selling lienholders who credit-bid for less than the full amount

of their security interests at the non-judicial foreclosure sales had their
deficiency judgments limited to the difference between the amount of the
security interest and the fair value of the property, not the amount bid at
the sale. 75 Thus, where a credit-bid was less than the fair value of the
property, section 580a created the legal fiction that the bid was for the
fair value of the property-regardless of the actual bid.76
Section 580b 77 attacked the problem more directly.78 It prohibits
Mertens, supra note 2, at 533; Note, CaliforniaFairValue LimitationsApplied to Non-Foreclosing Junior Lienholder, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 317, 319 (1982).
66. See Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1963); Hetland & Hansen, supra note 56, at 187-88; Mertens, supra note 2, at 541. See also R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.16.
67. See supra note 28 for a definition of "credit-bid."
68. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, §§ 4.16, 6.23.
69. See Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1963); Hetland & Hansen, supra note 56, at 187-88; Mertens, supra note 2, at 541. See also R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at § 4.16.
70. Mertens, supra note 2, at 541.
71. Id.
72. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875; Hatch, 19 Cal. 2d at
259, 120 P.2d at 872.
73. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).

74. Section 580a was designed to "prevent creditors from buying in at their own sales at
deflated prices and realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for large deficiencies."
Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875. Once a selling lienholder
credit-bids the amount of the debt, the debt is extinguished and no action for a deficiency will
lie against the debtor. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, §§ 5.24, 6.26.
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).

76. Id.
77. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976).

78. Section 580b provides in pertinent part:
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any deficiency judgment after a foreclosure of a "purchase money"7 9
mortgage or deed of trust (1) consisting of vendor financing or (2) on
owner-occupied residential property for four families or less.8" The practical effect of this rule is to prevent "down on their luck" homeowners
from being displaced and disabled by large deficiency judgments.8 1
These purchase-money debtors will lose the property, but they will not be
burdened by the remaining debt. Thus, section 580b protects residential
82
homeowners from deficiency judgments.

The purpose of section 580b is to prevent vendors of residential
property from overvaluing real property security. 3 In the standard residential transactions, where potential homeowners borrow purchasemoney from institutional lenders, accurate valuation is accomplished indirectly by placing the risk of inadequate security on the lenders.8 4 Theoretically, since these purchase-money lienholders cannot seek deficiency

judgments, they may refuse to lend potential vendors more than the
lienholders expect to recover from the property, resulting in a cap on the
property's value. The vendor could still overvalue the property by requiring the vendee to pay more than the standard down payment; howNo deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for
failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or
mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price
of real property ...on a dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to
secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase
price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976).
79. "Purchase money" transactions are those in which the loan proceeds are applied towards the purchase price of the property on which the lender has taken a security interest. R.
BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 1.1. There are two kinds of purchase money liens: vendors' liens
and third-party liens. Vendors' liens result when the seller of the property finances some or all
of the purchase price of the property. Id. § 4.26. Third-party liens result when a third-party
lender finances the purchase of property. Id.
80. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976).
81. Professor Hetland notes:
"The real property [foreclosure] system bears the indelible stamp of cases involving
security interests in both residential and business property where foreclosure can result not only in a dramatic forfeiture of most or all of the mortgagor's personal worth
but also may result in a deprivation of such basic necessities as shelter and the means
of earning a livelihood."
Hetland & Hansen, supra note 56, at 188.
82. Id. Section 580b is indirectly relevant to the focus of this Comment. Since section
580b protects the residential homeowner from deficiency judgments, the courts' application of
section 580a to purchasing SOJLs primarily impacts commercial transactions. See, e.g., R.
BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.26. Thus, the policies of the courts discussed below must be
considered in light of the parties that the courts are protecting.
83. Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 612, 498 P.2d 1055, 1060-61, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807,
812-13 (1972); Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
84. Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 612, 498 P.2d at 1060-61, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13; Roseleaf, 59
Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.

324

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:313

ever, the lienholder's appraisal amount and refusal to lend at a standard
loan-to-value ratio would still warn the vendee that the vendor has overvalued the property.
Enacted in 1939,85 section 580d86 was the California Legislature's
last antideficiency statute.8 7 Section 580d prohibits any deficiency judgment by a selling lienholder after a non-judicial foreclosure.8 8 Thus, this

provision implicitly appears to repeal section 580a. Lienholders cannot
be limited by the fair value of the property under section 580a if they are
prohibited by section 580d from recovering any deficiency judgment at

all. Unfortunately, the California Legislature did not repeal or amend
section 580a. This section remained dormant on the books-an outdated
law without any clear purpose.8 9 More than forty years later, however, a
purpose would be found: section 580a would limit the deficiency judg-

ments of purchasing SOJLs. 9°
III.

A.

SECTION

580A AND THE COURTS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

1933-1979: The California Courts Clearly Establish that Section
580a Does Not Apply to PurchasingSold-Out Junior
Lienholders

The major California case considering the application of section
580a9 1 to a sold-out junior lienholder (SOJL) was RoseleafCorp. v. Chier-

ighino.92 Roseleaf Corporation (Roseleaf) sold a hotel to Chierighino
who, in return, gave Roseleaf a note secured by a first trust deed on the
hotel and three notes secured by second trust deeds on unrelated real
85. 1939 Cal. Stat. 1991 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West
1976)).
86. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976). Section 580d provides in pertinent part:
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a deed
of trust or mortgage upon real property... in any case in which the real property has
been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in such mortgage or deed of trust.
Id.
87. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.12.
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976). Section 580d differs from section 580b in
that section 580b protects debtors who borrow purchase-money, and section 580d protects all
debtors whose property is sold after a non-judicial foreclosure. Id. §§ 580b, 580d (West 1976).
The purpose in limiting deficiency judgments after non-judicial foreclosures is to discourage
overvaluing the security. Union Bank v. Wendland, 54 Cal. App. 3d 393, 406, 126 Cal. Rptr.
549, 559 (1976). This is accomplished by placing the risk of overvaluation on the mortgagee.
Id.
89. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.18.
90. See Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981); Walter E. Heller
Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
91. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
92. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
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property owned by Chierighino and his relatives. 93 After the holders of
the first trust deeds on the three parcels foreclosed, thereby extinguishing
Roseleaf's security interest in those parcels, Roseleaf sued Chierighino
for the full amounts unpaid on his three notes.9 4 Chierighino contended
that the fair-value limitation of section 580a limited Roseleaf's deficiency
95
judgment.
The court, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, refused to apply section
580a to an SOJL.9 6 Justice Traynor argued that the express language of
section 580a limited its application to the selling lienholder. 97 Furthermore, Justice Traynor reasoned that fair-value limitations would serve no
purpose with respect to an SOJL because these provisions were "designed
to prevent creditors from buying in at their own sales at deflated prices
and realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for large deficiencies." 98 Justice Traynor recognized that the position of the SOJL is fundamentally different from the position of the selling lienholder:
The position of a junior lienor whose security is lost through a
senior sale is different from that of a selling senior lienor. A
selling senior can make certain that the security brings an
amount equal to his claim against the debtor or the fair market
value, whichever is less, simply by bidding in for that
amount.... The junior lienor, however, is in no better position
to protect himself than is the debtor. Either would have to invest additional funds to redeem or buy in at the sale. 99
In Roseleaf, Justice Traynor did not have the opportunity to consider whether a distinction exists between the purchasing SOJL and the
non-purchasing SOJL. However, the policies discussed in Roseleaf are
equally applicable to both SOJLs. 1° Neither SOJL can "credit-bid" at
the foreclosure sale.101 And, since neither SOJL can exercise a power of
sale, 10 2 the language of section 580a is equally inapplicable.
In 1966, the California Court of Appeal decided Dickey v. Wil93. Id. at 38, 378 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 40-41, 378 P.2d at 99-100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
100. Id. at 40-41, 378 P.2d at 99-100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
101. Nomellini Constr. Co. v. Modesto Say. & Loan Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 114, 115, 79
Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 (1969); Investcal, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 197, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
102. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1214 (West 1982); see also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57
Cal. 2d 621, 371 P.2d 578, 21 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1962).
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liams. 0 3 In that case, Williams loaned $25,000 to Dickey."° As consideration for the loan, Williams received a note secured by a second trust
deed on property in San Francisco and a third trust deed on property in
Sonoma. 0 The holders of the first trust deeds on both parcels foreclosed under their powers of sale.' 0 6 Williams purchased the Sonoma
property at the non-judicial foreclosure sale.' 0 7 The subsequent sale of
the San Francisco parcel to a third party resulted in the full payment of
the note secured by the first trust deed, and a surplus remained. 0 8 Thus,
the issue was whether that surplus should be applied to Williams' note,
or to four mechanic's lien claimants.' 9
Fishing for any antideficiency statute that would fit the facts of the
case, Dickey directed the court's attention to sections 580a, 580b, 10
580d,"' 725a" 2 and 726.113 The court, citing Roseleaf, stated that only
section 580b potentially could apply to this situation." 4 Williams, who
was an SOJL by virtue of the foreclosure of the San Francisco parcel
under the first trust deed, did not have his right to a deficiency out of the
surplus proceeds from the non-judicial foreclosure sale limited by section
580a. Thus, the court's silence with regard to section 580a constituted an
implicit acknowledgement that section 580a would not be applied to surplus proceeds resulting from multiple or excess security.''
Williams sought to recover the surplus proceeds from the non-judicial foreclosure sale, not a deficiency judgment.1 6 Consequently, Dickey
does not directly address the issue of whether a purchasing SOJL's deficiency judgment should be limited by the fair-value provision of section
580a. However, the reasoning in Dickey is applicable to the deficiency
judgment situation." 7
103. 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 40 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1966).
104. Id. at 271, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530. In fact, Dickey represented the actual borrower's
estate. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976).

111. Id. § 580d (West 1976).
112. Id. § 725a (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
113. Id. § 726 (West Supp. 1989).
114. Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
115. Id.; see Note, supra note 65, at 321-22 n.23.
116. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
117. If Williams' debt had not been satisfied out of the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale, and Williams had sued Dickey for a deficiency on the note, Williams would have had
the same recovery: (1) the Sonoma property; and (2) the funds necessary to satisfy the debt.
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Dickey argued that Williams would get an excess recovery if Williams were permitted to purchase the Sonoma property at significantly

less than the fair value in addition to the receipt of the surplus proceeds.1 18 The court responded that any purchaser at the foreclosure sale
is in a position to make a profit on the property:

[Dickey] suffered no greater detriment than if a complete stranger had purchased at the senior's sale, and [Williams] had no
The fact that [Wiladvantage unavailable to a stranger....
liams] bought the [Sonoma] property for cash at a public sale in

him from the sold out junior lienholder in
no way distinguishes
1 19

Roseleaf.
Analogously, SOJLs are not receiving a windfall or excess recovery

when they purchase the property for less than the fair value and then sue
the debtor for a deficiency judgment on the note. Any third party could
purchase the property at the foreclosure sale and resell it for a profit
equivalent to that made by the SOJL z0 because property tends to sell for
less at foreclosure sales than on the open market.12
Roseleaf,59 Cal. 2d at 39-40, 378 P.2d at 99-100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76 (holding that section
580a does not apply to "non-selling junior lienors"). Thus, the only difference between a
recovery from surplus proceeds and a deficiency on the note is the source of the funds recovered. In the former situation, the funds are available from the liquidation of the property, but
in the latter situation, the debtor must pay the judgment out-of-pocket.
118. Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
119. Id., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
120. Consider the following calculations: Assume that a parcel being sold at a foreclosure
sale has a value of $100,000. The amount unpaid on the SOJL's note is $30,000. A third party
who purchases the property for $70,000 will make a profit of $30,000. On the other hand, an
SOJL who purchases the property for $70,000 will just break even because the SOJL has already invested $30,000 in the property. Thus, a $30,000 deficiency judgment against the
debtor will result in the SOJL realizing the same profit as a third party.
In fact, even the selling lienholder will make a profit by purchasing the property. In the
above hypothetical, assume that the selling lienholder has an outstanding debt of $70,000. The
selling lienholder can purchase the property by credit-bidding the amount of the selling
lienholder's debt rather than paying cash. The selling lienholder cannot recover a deficiency,
yet will make a $30,000 profit from the property itself. Thus, section 580a's application to
purchasing SOJLs results in the purchasing SOJL being the only bidder at the foreclosure sale
who is not likely to make a profit by purchasing the property.
121. See Washburn, The Judicialand Legislative Response to PriceInadequacy in Mortgage
ForeclosureSales, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 843 (1980). See also Johnson & Hoffman, Inadequacy of
Sales Price at Judicially Ordered Sales of Real Property, 12 COLO. LAW. 1435 (1983). Both
articles specifically deal with the inadequacy'of the sales price of property at foreclosure sales
when the sale is supervised by the court. Undoubtedly, non-judicial foreclosure sales are as
likely as judicial foreclosures to result in inadequate prices. R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3,
§ 4.14. Thus, the California Legislature enacted section 580d, which prohibits any deficiency
by selling lienholders after non-judicial foreclosure sales. 1939 Cal. Stat. 1991 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976)).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:313

Investcal Realty Corp. v. Edgar H. Mueller Constr. Co.,' 22 decided
by the court of appeal the same year as Dickey, implicitly applied
Roseleaf's holding' 2 3 to a purchasing SOJL who sued the debtor for a
deficiency judgment on the note. 124 Investcal loaned $15,000 to Mueller's partnership. 25 The loan was secured by junior trust deeds on two
parcels of real property (parcel 1 and parcel 2).126 Investcal purchased
parcel 1 at the selling lienholder's foreclosure sale for $26,281.21, and
subsequently resold that parcel for $60,000. 127 Next, Investcal judicially
foreclosed on parcel 2 and, in addition, sought a deficiency judgment
against the debtors.' 2 8
The court first determined that Investcal was not precluded from
foreclosing on parcel 2, even though it had purchased parcel 1 at the
foreclosure sale.' 29 The court then considered section 726,30 but did not
find it necessary to discuss the fair-value limitation. '3' Just as in Dickey,
the Investcal Realty court's silence with regard to the application of fairvalue limitations to the deficiencies of purchasing SOJLs implied that the
issue had been decided by Roseleaf 13 2 Thus, in 1966, Roseleaf's discussion of section 580a appeared fully ingrained into California law.
This state of affairs, however, would not last. Although appearing
to be settled law, Roseleaf's refusal to apply section 580a to sold-out
junior lienholders would come under attack from the courts in the 1980s.
122. 247 Cal. App. 2d 190, 55 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1966).
123. Roseleaf held that section 580a is inapplicable to "nonselling" junior lienholders.
Roseleaf 59 Cal. 2d at 40-41, 378 P.2d at 99-100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.

124. See Note, supra note 65, at 321-22 n.23.
125. Investcal, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 193, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
126. Id., 55 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
127. Id. at 194, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 478. The court did not indicate that any question was

raised as to the fairness of the foreclosure sale. On the contrary, the facts indicated that Investcal's subsequent sale of the parcel may have been at an inflated price because, prior to the

closing of escrow, the purchaser obtained a zoning change from agricultural to commercial.
Id.

128. Id. at 194-95, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 478. Section 580a was not applicable since the foreclosure sale was "judicial." Instead, Mueller raised the fair-value limitation of section 726 which,
as previously noted, is essentially the same as the fair-value limitation of section 580a. Id.; see

also supra note 62.
129. Investcal, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 196-99, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81. The court stated that

"[i]f a junior lienholder . . . fortuitously has secured the deed of trust by a lien on other
property ... we cannot hold [that the junior lienholder] waived its secured interest as to the
other lien if the junior lienholder purchases the property at the senior lienholder's trustee
sale." Id. at 197-98, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 480. In the absence of the partnership's waiver of the
"one-action" rule of section 726, Investcal's only recourse was to foreclose on parcel 2. Id, at

196, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
130. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1989).
131. Investcal, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 197, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
132. See Note, supra note 65, at 321-22 n.23.
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1981-1989: The Application of Section 580a to the Purchasing
Sold-Out Junior Lienholder

The basic policy behind Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino's133 refusal to
apply section 580a' to SOJLs is that, as between the SOJL and the
debtor, the latter should bear the loss of the SOJL's deficiency created by
the debtor's default and the selling lienholder's foreclosure of the senior
trust deed.' 35 However, in 1981, the courts' view of section 580a
changed due to a perceived distinction between a purchasing SOJL and a
non-purchasing SOJL. 13 6 A purchasing SOJL who purchases the property at the non-judicial foreclosure sale for less than the fair value can
subsequently resell that property at the fair value. The 1980s courts contend that allowing the purchasing SOJL to recover both the property and

a judgment against the debtor for the full amount of the deficiency would
result in a windfall or excess recovery. 137 From this perspective, the dilemma is not whether the purchasing SOJL or the debtor should bear the
loss of the deficiency, but whether the purchasing SOJL should be permitted to make a profit while the debtor is saddled with a large deficiency
138
judgment.
At first, the courts' policy of protecting debtors from excess recoveries by lienholders appears to be justified. The SOJL should not get a
windfall at the expense of the debtor. However, this argument begs the
question in the context of purchasing SOJLs. The analysis assumes that
133. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
134. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
135. Roseleaf,59 Cal. 2d at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876 ("Equitable considerations favor placing this burden on the debtor not only because it is his default that provokes
the senior sale, but also because he has the benefit of his bargain with the junior lienor who,
unlike the selling senior, might otherwise end up with nothing."). The debtor is the cheapest
cost avoider. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876. The SOJL has
no control over the debtor's default and, thus, cannot prevent the loss occasioned by the default and foreclosure.
136. See, eg., Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981); Walter E.
Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
137. Bank ofHemet, 643 F.2d at 669; Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273-74, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 429-30; see also Arnold, supra note 2, at 19 ("The principal factor in [these] decisions
was the belief that application of Section 580a was essential to prevention of an excess recovery
by the purchasing junior lienor.").
138. See Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:313

the profit made by the purchasing SOIL is a windfall or
an excess recov40
ery. 139 In fact, such a characterization is inaccurate.'

The remainder of this section analyzes the three major cases of the
1980s and identifies their erroneous underlying assumptions: (1) Bank of
Hemet v. United States,'4 ' which first applied section 580a to a purchas-

ing SOJL; (2) Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 42 which incorporated the Bank of Hemet rule into California law; and (3) PacificLoan
Management v. Superior Court,14 3 where the court questioned the first
two cases in dicta, but indicated that it might follow the Heller Western
rule in a case directly on point.
1. Bank of Hemet v. United States: an illegitimate case

makes bad law
In Bank of Hemet, Bank of Hemet (Bank) held a non-purchasemoney second trust deed on real property, and the United States held tax

liens junior to the Bank's trust deed." 4 Both the Bank and the United
States became SOJLs after a senior lienholder foreclosed on the first trust
deed. 4' 5 The Bank purchased the real property at the foreclosure sale for
two dollars more than the amount owed on the first trust deed. 14 6 Approximately four months later, the United States sought to exercise its
federal post-sale statutory right of redemption.14 7 The United States ten-

dered the amount that the Bank paid for the property, plus interest at the
statutory rate, to the Bank.'48 The Bank accepted the tender under protest and sued the United States, alleging that the amount tendered to the
139. Id. See also Note, supra note 65, at 323 ("The Bank of Hemet court correctly perceived that fair-value provisions such as section 580a are intended to prevent any creditor from
reaping a windfall at the debtor's expense by combining a deficiency judgment with a bargain
purchase of the property.").
140. See infra notes 246-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the purchasing
SOJL's profit should be characterized.
141. 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
142. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
143. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1987).
144. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 663.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. "Post-sale statutory right of redemption" refers to a statutory right to buy back
property which already has been sold at a foreclosure sale to another party. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 5.72. In California, a statutory right of redemption exists in favor of
the debtor after a judicial foreclosure sale if a creditor seeks a deficiency judgment. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 729.010 (West Supp. 1989). However, as discussed in this case, the federal
government has a statutory right of redemption where it holds tax liens against real property.
See 26 U.S.C. § 7425(d) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1982).
148. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 663.
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Bank by the United States was improper.14 9 The trial court granted the
United States' motion for summary judgment. 150
In order to calculate the United States' redemption price, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine to what extent the Bank's
junior lien was discharged by its purchase of the property at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale.' 5 1 Both parties agreed that California law determined whether the Bank was entitled to a deficiency judgment against
the debtor.'5 2 The court first held that section 580d of the California
Code of Civil Procedure 5 3 was inapplicable to an SOJL; therefore, the
Bank could obtain a deficiency judgment. 154 The court then discussed
whether the Bank's deficiency judgment would be limited by section
580a.155 The court stated that "[t]he Roseleaf Court did not treat [section 580a] as superceded [sic] by section 580d and also held it to be inapplicable to 'nonselling junior lienors.' ,156 Thus, had the court followed
Roseleaf, the non-selling SOJL's (the Bank's) right to a full-deficiency
judgment would not be impaired by the fair-value provision of section
580a. 1 7 However, to apply section 580a, the court seized upon the
Bank's purchase of the real property at the selling lienholder's foreclosure sale as a key factor that distinguished this case from Roseleaf:
This case is, however, distinguishable from Roseleaf in that
here the junior lienholder did bid on and purchase the property
which, strong evidence suggests, at the time had a fair value
substantially in excess of the amount of the senior lienholder's
debt. In brief, the Bank was not a sold-out junior lienholder as
was the case in Roseleaf.'18
This distinction was based upon the "general purpose of section 580a,"
149. Id. The Bank felt that the tender was improper because the Bank was not paid the
value of its investment in the property. Id. The government redeemed the property for the
amount that the Bank had paid; however, the Bank had also invested the amount of its unpaid
debt in the property. Id.
The other theory relied upon by the Bank was that the government's redemption constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 667.
152. Id.
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976). Recall that section 580d precludes a
foreclosing lienholder from seeking any deficiency judgment after a non-judicial foreclosure.
Id.; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
154. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 667-68.
155. Id. at 668-70.
156. Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 669.
158. Id.
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which is preventing lienholders from buying the property at a deflated
price, obtaining a deficiency judgment and reselling the property at a
profit. 159 The court did not, however, attempt to prove that the Legislature intended section 580a to prevent all lienholders from buying the
property at the foreclosure sale and recovering a deficiency judgment free
of the fair-value limitations of section 580a. In fact, the court recognized
that its holding required "the imposition of a gloss [on section 580a], that
a deficiency judgment could only be allowed to the extent that the combined debt of the senior and junior lienholders exceeded the property's
fair market value."",o
The court's attempted justification for its "gloss" was not compelling. Being a federal court, the Ninth Circuit knew that the Bank of
Hemet opinion would be charged as an improper creation of state law. 16
Thus, in an effort to support its interpretation of section 580a and dispell
federalism concerns, the court sweepingly concluded that "[t]he unmistakable policy of California is to prevent excess recoveries by secured
creditors." '6 2 Remarkably, the court did not cite any authority for this
proposition.
The court's statement was irrelevant in this context. The court
begged the question of why this was an "excess" recovery. Rather, the
decision to label the profit made by a purchasing SOJL an "excess recovery" was dispositive.16 1 Although lienholders should not be allowed to
use their status to take unfair advantage of debtors, a purchasing SOJL
who purchases the property at the non-judicial foreclosure sale for a bargain price reaps a benefit that is available to any third-party purchaser.'1
Thus, while the court spoke of "excess recovery," the effect of this decision was to penalize junior lienholders for having a subordinate security
interest.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. This is a tautology since "excess" is defined as "the fact of exceeding specified
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 311 (1978).
163. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669.
164. See Dickey v. Williams, 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531 (1966).
Assume that the SOJL purchases the property for the amount of the selling lienholder's debt

limits in amount." THE

($70,000). The SOJL still has not recovered the amount of his debt ($30,000). The fair value
is equivalent to the amounts of both the senior and junior debts ($100,000). If section 580a
applies, then the purchasing SOJL will have the property with just enough equity to recover
the combined debts, but cannot sue the debtor for a deficiency. On the other hand, a third
party could purchase the property for the same price ($70,000) and resell the property at the
fair value ($100,000). Thus, the SOJL only recovers potential losses, but the third party makes
a profit of $30,000.
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At least one commentator believed Bank of Hemet contradicted
Roseleaf,yet believed that Bank of Hemet was decided correctly.1 65 The
commentator argued that the Ninth Circuit was the first court to perceive the true California law on antideficiency limitations.16 6 This view is
founded upon the commentator's perception that the California antideficiency limitations were intended by the Legislature only to be a

framework that was to be completed by the courts. 167 However, even if
this perspective were correct, the commentator does not explain how this
position justifies a federal court overturning California law. The principles of comity and federalism require that state courts be the ultimate
interpreters of state laws.168 California's highest court had settled this

matter in Roseleaf

169

Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals over-

1 70
stepped its constitutional bounds by creating California law.

165. See Note, supra note 65, at 322-24. The author stated that "due largely to the
[Roseleaf] court's authoritative treatment of section[] 580a... in connection with sold-out
juniors, no subsequent California case has questioned Roseleaf." Id. at 321. This commentator further stated that "[c]ontrary to the rather clear holding in Roseleaf, the Bank of Hemet
court perceived a real difference between a sold-out junior lienor who purchases at the senior's
sale and one who does not." Id. at 322.
166. Id. at 317. The commentator is referring to the Ninth Circuit's "superior understanding of the purpose of California's debtor protection laws." Id.
167. Id. at 322 ("California's anti-deficiency rules... are best viewed, not as a completed
system of regulation, but only as a framework for that system."). However, Professor Hetland
has referred to this system as "California's elaborate and interrelated set of antideficiency and
foreclosure statutes." Hetland & Hansen, supra note 56, at 185.
168. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
169. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 39, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875. In fact, the Bank of
Hemet court recognized that its opinion was inconsistent with Roseleaf. The court stated:
To refuse to apply this policy, together with its implications and refinements, to the
facts of this case because such facts fit section 580a's language somewhat awkwardly
and because of the result reached by the California court in Roseleafwould amount
to a rejection of the spirit of California's law in favor of its letter. We decline to do
this.
Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669.
170. See McKenna, 622 F.2d at 661 (federal courts must look to the body of state law and
attempt to predict how a state's highest court would decide the issue).
Note that Bank ofHemet was not a conventional antideficiency case. Bank ofHemet was
not an action for a deficiency, and the debtor was not a party. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at
663. The action was between a purchasing SOJL and the United States arising from the latter's statutory redemption under a junior tax lien. Id.
Moreover, the court's desire to change California law resulted in legal gymnastics. The
court's strained application of section 580a precluded the Bank from recovering a deficiency
because the Bank had failed to file its action to recover a deficiency within the three month
statute of limitations provided in section 580a. Id. at 669. However, the court interpreted the
federal statutory redemption law to compensate the Bank for the equivalent of its deficiency.
Id. at 666-70. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(d) (1976) and Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(2)(ii) (1988) for
the redemption formula used by the court.
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Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham

In Heller Western, the California Court of Appeal ratified the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Bank of Hemet. 7 ' Heller Western had funded a series of loans to Bloxham that were consolidated into one note, secured by
trust deeds on lots owned by Bloxham. 7 The trust deeds were then
subordinated to a loan made by Newport Equity Fund Trust 291.173 After Bloxham's default, Newport Equity exercised its power of sale under
the first trust deed. 7 4 Heller Western purchased the property at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale and sought a deficiency judgment against Bloxham for the full unpaid value of the note plus interest. 17 On appeal,
Bloxham contended that the property was purchased at less than the fair
value and, thus, Heller Western's deficiency judgment should be limited
by section 580a.' 7 6
Whereas Justice Traynor held in Roseleaf that section 580a did not
apply to any SOJL,1 77 the Bank of Hemet court held that section 580a
did apply to purchasing SOJLs. 178 The Heller Western court, agreeing
with Bank of Hemet, distinguished between a purchasing SOJL and a
non-purchasing SOJL. 179 The reason for this distinction was that the
application of section 580a to non-purchasing SOJLs would be to limit
their deficiencies based upon "someone else's bid."' 8 ° On the other hand,
if SOJLs purchase the property, then their deficiencies are limited by
their own bids.'
Thus, the court's adoption of the Bank of Hemet posi182
tion was based largely upon the issue of control of the purchase price.
The court concluded by echoing Bank of Hemet's incantation: "'the
unmistakable policy of California is to prevent excess recoveries by se-

cured creditors.'

"183

The Heller Western court's analysis is based upon an illusory dis171. Heller Western, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 272-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 428-30.
172. Id. at 269, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
173. Id.
174. Id., 221 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
175. Id. at 269-70, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The property later was conveyed to Heller Western. Id. at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
176. Id.
177. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875.

178. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669.
179. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
180. Id. at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
181. Id. at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
182. See Mertens, supra note 2, at 542.
183. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 274, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 430 (quoting Bank'of
Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661, 669 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court reasoned that the
purchasing SOJL would be able to compensate for the lost deficiency by being a purchaser of
the property at a bargain price. Id., 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
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tinction. The court contended that the purchasing SOJL controls the
purchase price. 18 4 However, this premise is illogical. The SOJL shows
up at a senior lienholder's foreclosure sale. The SOJL has no more control over the selling price of the property than any other non-selling bidder at the sale. In fact, the SOJL and debtor have common incentives:
to make sure that the sale is fair, and that a reasonable price is received
for the property.185 Bidding is in the SOIL's self-interest when a reasonable price will not be received for the property.18 6
Generally, the SOJL is motivated to protect himself by bidding an
amount just less than the unpaid amounts on both the senior and junior

security interests.1 87 If a third party purchases the property for more

than this amount, the surplus18 8 would be distributed by the trustee 18 9
either to another SOJL 190 or, in the absence of another secured party, to
the debtor. 19 1 Thus, while purchasing SOJLs are in control of how much
they bid, they are not in control of the point at which the bidding
stops. 192 Logically, the junior lienholder would bid no more than neces184. Id. at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
185. Roseleaf,59 Cal. 2d at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 876. The debtor's incentive is based upon a desire to avoid a deficiency judgment. Id. Similarly, SOJLs desire to
recover as much of the debt as possible from the foreclosure of the security to avoid the costs
of suing the debtor for a deficiency. Id. In contrast, selling lienholders are motivated either to
sell the property for a price high enough to cover their own debts, or to buy the property at a
bargain price and reap the profit. Id.
Ironically, the ,selling lienholder will make the profit which Heller Western and Bank of
Hemet seek to deny the purchasing SOJL. See Hetland, supra note 69, at 29. A selling
lienholder who credit-bids the full amount of the senior debt, thereby purchasing the property,
may recover a parcel that has a fair value in excess of the debt. Id. Thus, the selling lienholder
can usually make a profit without seeking a deficiency judgment. Id. The purchasing SOJL
will not make a profit unless the property value is greater than the combined total of the senior
and junior debts and the purchasing SOJL's additional cash outlay to buy the property.
186. R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.14 ("If the property is worth more than the debt...
the bid will be less than the market value of the property... and there will be no surplus for
the debtor or junior lienholders.").
187. No purpose is served by the SOJL bidding more than necessary to purchase the
property.
188. The surplus is the amount of the sale proceeds which exceeds the amount of the foreclosing lienholder's lien.
189. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 1.6 (2d ed. 1985).
190. For example, there might be a third trust deed.
191. Surplus proceeds are distributed first to junior secured creditors and then, if a surplus
remains, to the debtor. See 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 10, § 3:120.
192. As recognized in Roseleaf,the foreclosing creditor has created the environment of the
sale and, in the absence of antideficiency protections, might intentionally hold down the price
of the property to reap a double recovery. Roseleaf 59 Cal. 2d at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 875; Hatch v. Security First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 254, 259, 120 P.2d
869, 872 (1942) ("The evil which led to the enactment of this legislation became pronounced
during the recent period of economic depression when creditors were frequently able to bid in
the debtor's real property at a nominal figure and also to hold the debtor personally liable for a
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sary to purchase the property. However, under the Bank of Hemet and
Heller Western applications of section 580a, the junior's bid is imputed
by law to be a bid at the fair value of the property up to the amount of
the junior and selling lienholders' combined debts. 193
A hypothetical will help to illustrate this point. A selling lienholder
(S)holds a foreclosure sale which is attended by a junior lienholder (J). J
had taken no part in the arrangements for the sale and the turnout is
small. The property being sold has a fair value of $100,000. The amount
of S's lien is $70,000, and J's lien is for $30,000. The bidding stops at
$70,000. J now has two alternatives: allow the property to be sold to a
third party for $70,000, and then sue the debtor (D) on the note for a
$30,000 deficiency,' 9 4 or bid up the price and purchase the property. In
this latter case, however, section 580a will make J's bid legally equivalent
to $100,000,195 thereby satisfying both S's and J's debts.196

3.

Pacific Loan Management v. Superior Court

In Pacific Loan Management, the California Court of Appeal struggled with both the 1960s and 1980s lines of cases.1 97 Pacific Loan Management Corp. (Pacific) acted as the trustee on behalf of the selling
lienholder in a non-judicial foreclosure of certain property.19 8 The property was purchased by the junior lienholder, the United States Small
Business Administration (SBA).1 99 After the selling lienholder was paid,
both the SBA and the debtor claimed the surplus proceeds remaining
large proportion of the original debt."). Holding down the bidding at foreclosure sales can be
done in various ways. For example, the trustee, who is often an agent of the selling lienholder,
could hold the foreclosure sale in a warehouse in the worst part of town on a rainy day. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924g (West 1989) for foreclosure sale time and place requirements. When
sale conditions are poor, a large turnout of potential purchasers is unlikely. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 121, at 848-49.
Another tactic designed to keep bidding down might be to advertise the foreclosure sale in
a newspaper with a small circulation. See, e.g., id. at 848. In any event, non-selling SOJLs do
not control foreclosure sales.
193. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669; Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 429.
194. J would be entitled to a deficiency judgment in this situation even under Heller Western as a non-purchasing SOJL. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
Of course, J risks that D will become insolvent.
195. The purchasing SOJL's bid is imputed to be the fair value of the property. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
196. $100,000 is the combined total of the debts.
197. See supra notes 91-132 for a discussion of these cases.
198. Pacific Loan Management, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1488, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
199. Id.
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from the foreclosure sale. 2" Pacific filed an action in interpleader and
requested to be discharged, arguing that it was merely a stakeholder of
unclaimed funds. 2"' The trial court denied this request.2 "2 The court of
appeal held that the trial court'should have granted the interpleader, and
that the SBA did not lose its right to the surplus proceeds by purchasing
the property.20 3 The opinion questioned the reasoning supporting the
Heller Western holding. °4
The court argued that this case was not distinguishable from Dickey
v. Williams. 20 5 If Dickey could recover a deficiency out of the surplus
proceeds from the foreclosure of a different parcel, 20 6 it follows that an
SOIL should be able to recover a deficiency out of the surplus proceeds
from the foreclosed parcel.2 7 Furthermore, the court was not concerned
about the potential profit to be made by the SBA:
[The debtor] argues that SBA now has the property, may sell it
at a profit, and will not have to account to [the debtor] for that
profit. Therefore it is not equitably entitled to the surplus.
This conclusion does not follow. SBA has no legal duty, as a
general proposition, to account to [the debtor] for the profits of
its investments. Nor do we pervceive any unfairness in these
facts such as would give rise to any equitable duty in SBA to
account for such hypothetical profit .... Whether SBA, or [a
third party], is the owner of the property makes no difference so
20 8
far as [the debtor's] economic position is concerned.
The court took issue with Heller Western's distinction between
purchasing SOJLs and non-purchasing SOJLs.20 9 The court noted that
"no presumption of unfair advantage should result simply because the
secured party purchases the collateral, when prescribed statutory safe200. Id. In other words, the SBA claimed the surplus funds that it had paid out when it
purchased the property.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1495, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
204. The Pacific Loan Managrment court observed:
The Heller decision rests on the tacit assumption that a foreclosure sale auction frequently results in a sale below the fair value of the property. We express no opinion
on whether that is a justified assumption or whether such an assumption should legitimately control the decision to apply... section 580a to a junior lienor/purchaser.
Id. at 1494, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
205. Pacific Loan Managment, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1493, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552 (citing
Dickey v. Williams, 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 49 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1966)).
206. Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
207. Pacific Loan Managment, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1493, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
208. Id. at 1493-94, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
209. Id. at 1494 n.2, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553 n.2.
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guards are met., 2 10
Although the Pacific Loan Management court appeared to disapprove of Heller Western's holding, the court recognized that Heller Western was still good law.2 11 Thus, the SBA was entitled to the surplus
proceeds from the non-judicial foreclosure sale, but may not have been
entitled to a deficiency judgment.2 12
The remaining question is what effect does Pacific Loan Management have on Heller Western? The answer is that it has no formal effect
on Heller Western because the two cases are inapposite. Pacific Loan
Management deals with the issue of whether the debtor or the purchasing
SOIL has a prior right to the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure
sale.213 On the other hand, Heller Western deals with the issue of
whether a purchasing SOIL is limited by the fair value of the property in
an action for a deficiency judgment against the debtor.214 Nothing in
Heller Western prevents any SOIL from recovering the surplus proceeds
from the foreclosure sale up to the amount of the SOJL's security inter-

est. Thus, much of PacificLoan Management's criticism of Heller Western was gratuitous.
This does not mean that Pacific Loan Management is completely

irrelevant to the issue raised in Heller Western. By focusing on the
debtor's economics rather than the purchasing SOJL's profit,2 1 Pacific

Loan Management has planted the seed for the California Supreme
Court to overrule Heller Western. Adopting this "debtor-centered" orientation,21 6 the Supreme Court could logically determine that the
210. Pacific Loan Management, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1494 n.2, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553 n.2.
See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924g (West 1989) (time and place of foreclosure sale safeguards).
211. Id. at 1495 n.3, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553 n.3.
212. Id.
213. The court stated that "[h]ere, however, we are not yet measuring what deficiency judgment, if any, SBA may collect against [the debtor]. We deal instead with the surplus generated
by SBA's own overbid, a fund actually provided with cash out of SBA's pocket." Id. at 1495,
242 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
214. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
215. PacificLoan Management, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1493-94, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552. This
focus is essentially the same as the focus used by the Dickey court in holding that section 580a
should not be applied in the context of a purchasing SOJL. Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 272,
49 Cal. Rptr. at 530. Why should the debtor's liability for a deficiency be based upon whether
the property is purchased by the SOJL or by a third party? If section 580a were not applied to
the purchasing SOJL in this situation, the debtor's economic position would be the same no
matter who purchased the property. Id. Only the focus on the potential profit to be made by
the purchasing SOJL concerned the Bank of Hemet and Heller Western courts. See Bank of
Hemet, 643 F.2d at 669; Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
As previously discussed, however, this potential profit is available to any stranger who
purchases property at a foreclosure sale. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
216. In using a "debtor-centered" analysis, the supreme court would concentrate on the
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purchasing SOJL's recovery of a full deficiency judgment is a legitimate
recovery, not an excess recovery.2 17 Even without the Heller Western
rule, the debtor would be in a better position if the purchasing SOJL
purchases the property than if a third party purchases it.2 18 Thus, the
purchasing SOL's potential for a profit should not be restricted.
In the meantime, Pacific Loan Managment provides ways around
the application of section 580a to the purchasing SOL. In its attempt to
reconcile the cases, Pacific Loan Management verified that Investcal's
refusal to apply section 580a in multiple security contexts is still good
law. 21 9 Furthermore, Pacific Loan Management, following Dickey, established that section 580a should not be applied to limit a purchasing
SOIL's recovery of surplus proceeds from a non-judicial foreclosure
sale.220 Thus, to avoid the consequences of section 580a, SOJLs now
have a strong incentive to oversecure their debts, thereby insuring that a
fund will exist for recovery of deficiencies. 221 However, while structuring
transactions to avoid section 580a makes sense from a creditor's perspective, the proliferation of these transactions may have detrimental effects
fact that the debtor is not any worse off if the SOJL purchases the property than if a third
party purchases it.
217. This "debtor-centered" orientation finds support from the Alaska Supreme Court.
Adams v. Fedalaska Fed. Credit Union, 757 P.2d 1040 (1988). In Adams, a purchasing SOJL
sued the mortgagor for a deficiency on the note. Id. at 1041. The mortgagor cited Heller
Western as persuasive authority for the proposition that the purchasing SOIL equitably should
be limited by the fair value of the property. Id. at 1043. After determining that the requisite
statutory foundation did not exist to create such a rule, the court flatly disagreed with Heller
Western:
[T]here is a strong argument against the position of the California court. That is, if
the Alaska law is strictly followed, the position of [the debtor] is no different whether
[the purchasing SOJL] or a third party buys the property. In either case [the
purchasing SOJL] would lose its security and [the debtor] would be personally liable
on the note. Under the [California approach] [the debtor] fortuitously benefits by
[the purchasing SOJL's] purchase.
Id. at 1043-44.
218. See Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real
Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording System and TheirConsequences, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 105, 125-26 nn.64-67 (1988); Washburn, supra note 121, at 848-49; see also infra notes
230-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the debtor's advantage from competitive
bidding.
219. Pacific Loan Management, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1492-95, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 551-53.
220. Id. at 1495, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Creditors are more likely to compensate for the
risks of being a junior lienholder by engaging in forms of "loss cushioning," including internalizing the potential costs into their interest rates. See Schechter, supra note 218, at 125-26
nn.64-67. This internalization spreads those costs to all debtors who give creditors junior security. Id. at 125 n.64 ("Secured creditors take collateral at the outset of a transaction as a
means of assuring a source of collection in the event of a subsequent default. To the extent
that collection is uncertain, interest rates will rise overall."). Thus, many debtors who have
never missed a payment share the costs of default with the defaulting debtors.
221. See Schechter, supra note 218, at 132 n.89.
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on the economy. 222
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In Part III, this Comment discussed analytical difficulties with the
courts' reasoning in cases holding that the fair-value limitation of section
580a 22 3 should be applied to purchasing SOJLs. 224 Among these difficulties is the charge that the Bank of Hemet v. United States 2 5 court improperly created state law, 226 and the fallacy that the junior lienholder's
profit is an "excess" recovery.22 7 Additionally, the Walter E. Heller
Western, Inc. v. Bloxham 228 court's contention that somehow the
purchasing SOIL controls the amount of the selling price by bidding on
the property at the foreclosure sale was shown to be erroneous. 2 29 Beyond these formal or doctrinal concerns, however, Part IV considers the
broader social policies which militate against the application of section
580a to purchasing SOJLs.
A.

The DetrimentalEffect on the Debtor

The application of section 580a 231 to purchasing SOJLs may actually be adverse to the interests of the debtor. Before Bank of Hemet v.
United States,23 ' the SOIL would be motivated to purchase the property
at the foreclosure sale because, in a worst case scenario, the SOIL would
have the property to resell. The SOIL could then sue on the note for a
deficiency judgment which would not be limited by section 580a.2 32 Following Bank of Hemet and Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 33
222. If creditors routinely required excess security, then debtors would not be able to make
efficient use of their equity since a significant amount of equity would be unnecessarily tied up.
See generally Schechter, supra note 218, at 132 n.89 ("That marginal increase in the use of
secured credit entails added and unnecessary costs; not only are the parties' transaction costs
increased, but the encumbrance of debtors' assets will restrict the flow of credit."). This increase in the use of security has added transaction and social costs. Id.
223. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
224. See supra notes 133-222 and accompanying text.
225. 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
226. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
227. See Bank ofHemet, 643 F.2d at 669; see also supra notes 163-64, 183 and accompanying text.
228. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
229. Id. at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429; see also supra notes 184-96 and accompanying
text.
230. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
231. 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
232. See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963); see also supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roseleaf's refusal to apply section 580a to SOJLs,
233. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
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the SOJL has to make a choice. The SOJL can forego purchasing the
property and sue the debtor for a full deficiency judgment,23 4 or purchase
the property and recover a deficiency judgment limited by the fair-value

provision of section 580a.235 Many SOJLs will opt for the first alterna-

tive in an effort to recover the entire unpaid amounts of their notes.
SOJLs choosing the second alternative are limited by section 580a, and
generally will recover less than the entire unpaid amounts.23 6
An SOJL who purchases property at a foreclosure sale must bear
significant costs before realizing a recovery against the debt. First, the
SOJL must sell the property. Thus, many SOJLs must absorb real estate
agents' commissions. In addition, the SOJL either would have to insure
the property or risk waste during the interim between the purchase and
the sale of the property.2 37 As the owner of the property, the SOJL

would risk liability to third parties.2 38 Furthermore, institutional lenders
would absorb significant administrative costs in managing their inventory
of properties. Courts do not consider any of these costs in determining
the fair value of property purchased at a foreclosure sale.2 39
Assuming that Bank of Hemet and Heller Western have increased

the likelihood that the SOJL will not bid on the property at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, at least one fewer interested bidder will attend

the sale. This "chilling" effect most likely will lead to higher deficiency
judgments by SOJLs against debtors. 24 For example, in the hypotheti234. See id. at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
235. Id. at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
236. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 19.
237. Vacant property seems to invite waste. Generally, lienholders have no remedy at law
for waste. See Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 542 P.2d 981, 125 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1975) (lienholder has action against debtor only for bad-faith waste).
238. See generally Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968). See also D. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 285-309 (1985) for a comprehensive
discussion of landowner liability.
239. See Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood, Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 369-70, 209 Cal. Rptr.
294, 300 (1985) ("Construing the phrase 'fair value' ... as taking into consideration all the
disabilities attending a foreclosure sale would be unreasonable, because it would permit the
lender the double recovery the statute was intended to prevent."). See Washburn, supra note
121, at 907-16, for a comprehensive discussion of "fair-market value" statutes.
240. Commentators have argued that "the presence of competitive bidding reduces the
chance that the property will sell below its fair market value." Schechter, supra note 218, at
547 n.147. Since an SOJL is motivated under certain circumstances to bid on the property,
"chilling" the SOJL's bid weakens the competition at the foreclosure sale, thereby resulting in
harm to the debtor. Id.; Washburn, supra note 121, at 848-49; see also Riley v. Martinelli, 97
Cal. 575, 582, 32 P. 579, 580 (1893) ("The law of this state, with a view, no doubt, of benefiting
the debtor, by causing his property to bring the best attainable price, permits and encourages
the creditor, alike with others, to purchase at sales under execution .... "); Sternberger v.
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cal discussed above,2 4 1 if J does not bid at the sale, then the property is
sold for $70,000. Thus, J is entitled to sue D for a deficiency of $30,000.
However, under the holding of Investcal Realty Corp. v. Edgar H. Mueller Constr. Co.,24z J could have purchased the property at the foreclosure

sale for $80,000243 and still sued D for a deficiency of $20,000.2 4
Clearly, D is better off in the second scenario. If J does not purchase the
Ragland, 57 Ohio St. 148, 160, 48 N.E. 811, 813 (1897) ("[E]very additional bid is necessarily
an advantage to the [debtor].").
At least one commentator has questioned whether Bank ofHemet and Heller Western will
"chill" the SOJLs' bids. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 19 ("Bloxham has been described as
inconsistent with another goal of 'fair value' limits, namely promoting full bidding at foreclosure sales, since it can create a marked disincentive on the part of a junior lienor to bid at a
senior foreclosure sale.. . ."). However, Arnold contends that, in fact, the disincentive to the
SOJL may succumb to expediency:
There are many settings in which a junior lienor will choose the potentially more
expedient method of "bidding in" at a bargain price and reselling the property. This
may be a far more attractive possibility than proceeding slowly through the courts to
collect an unsecured obligation from a party who, if sufficiently creditworthy to justify pursuing, may possess the requisite resources to mount a protracted defense.
Id.
241. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
242. 247 Cal. App. 2d 190, 55 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1966); see also supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of Investcal.
243. This $80,000 figure is used to simplify the hypothetical. In most cases, a reasonable
SOJL will bid only one dollar more than the amount of the next highest bid. Thus, it may
appear that the debtor comes out virtually the same whether the SOJL or a third party
purchases the property (the debtor is one dollar worse off if the third party purchases it).
However, this conclusion would be unjustified. The SOJL's presence at the foreclosure sale as
an interested bidder may result in significantly lower deficiency judgments against the debtor.
See Schechter, supra note 218, at 158 n.147 ("The increased selling price resulting from more
competitive bidding reduces pro-tanto the amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied.").
Moreover, the SOJL's bidding activity could have a catalytic effect. How high the bidding
ultimately will go depends upon how much the "'lively concourse of bidders'" is willing to
pay for the property. Id. (citing B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTION UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.8[5][a] (1980)).
For example, in the above hypothetical, suppose that the bidding stops at $70,000 (the
amount of the senior debt). By not bidding, J can recover a $30,000 deficiency judgment
against D. However, J reasonably could bid as much as the fair value of the property
($100,000) less 's expenses of owning and selling the property. See Rainer Mortgage v.
Silverwood, Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1985) (holding that the
costs incident to foreclosure sales are excluded from the "fair value" of the property). Thus, J
might raise the bidding to $70,001. The $70,000 bidder might respond by raising the bid to
$72,000. J might respond by bidding $72,001, and so on until J buys the property for $80,000.
Under Roseleafand Investcal, J would own the property and recover only a $20,000 deficiency,
resulting in a benefit to D in the amount of $10,000.
J may choose to sue the debtor for the $30,000 deficiency rather than bid on the property
because Heller Western and Bank of Hemet would eliminate J's deficiency (the hypothetical
property has a fair value which is equivalent to the amount of the combined senior and junior
debts). Thus, by chilling J's bid, Heller Western and Bank of Hemet may inflict a $10,000 loss
on D.
244. Under the Investcal rule, J would be entitled to a deficiency judgment against the
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property, then a third party would realize the profit from purchasing the
property at a bargain price, J would sue D for a full deficiency, and D
would have to pay J $10,000 more than if J had purchased the property.
Thus, this application of section 580a actually costs debtors in the long
run when it "chills" the SOJLs' bids.24 5
B.

The Characterizationof Additional Funds

In Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino,24 6 the California Supreme Court
held that section 580a did not apply to SOJLs because SOJLs, like debtors, have to invest "additional funds" to purchase the property at the
foreclosure sale.24 7 This "additional funds" rationale applies equally to
both the purchasing SOJL and the non-purchasing SOJL.2 48 This section
explains why the infusion of additional funds into the property justifies
the profit made by the purchasing SOJL.
The primary policy consideration relied upon by Bank of Hemet v.
United States24 9 and Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham25° is
that, equitably, purchasing SOJLs should recover no more than the unpaid amount of their notes from the sum of the property and a deficiency
judgment.25 1 This policy must be premised upon the overly-simplistic
contention that purchasing SOJLs have received the benefit of their bargain when they recover their funds plus any accrued interest.2 52 In fact,
purchasing SOJLs have invested much more than their original cash outlay and, therefore, deserve more in return for their investments.
The lending and foreclosing process illustrates exactly how much
the purchasing SOJL invests in the property. The purchasing SOIL
loans cash to the debtor, who invests the cash in the real property. Subsequently, the debtor defaults. In order to protect this interest in the
debtor even if J did purchase the property at the foreclosure sale. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
245. See Schechter, supra note 218, at 158 ("[A]ny enhancement of the collection process
will result in increased creditor recoveries and thus decreased debtor deficiencies. The idea
that enhancing the collection process favors debtors, although somewhat counterintuitive, is
well established.").
246. 59 Cal. -2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
247. Id. at 41, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
248. Id. Note that only the selling lienholder can credit-bid, thereby purchasing the property without investing any additional funds. See supra note 28.
249. 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
250. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
251. Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 668-69; Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 272-74, 221
Cal. Rptr. at 427-29.
252. Note, supra note 65, at 323 ("[Having elected to purchase, all that is required to give
the junior the 'benefit of his bargain' is to allow him to recoup that portion of his debt not
satisfied from the subsequent sale of the property.").
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property, the purchasing SOJL bids on and purchases the property at the

non-judicial foreclosure sale. However, unlike the selling lienholder, the
purchasing SOJL cannot "credit-bid.,1 5 3 Thus, the purchasing SOJL
must invest additional cash to buy the property.
In the above hypothetical,2 5 a S's first trust deed is $70,000 and J's
second trust deed is $30,000. Since S is motivated to "credit-bid" on the

property for $70,000,255 J has to bid in for at least $70,000 cash to buy
the property. 56 Thus, J's total cash investment in the property is at least
$100,000, which is equivalent to the full value.25 7
This additional investment can be characterized in two ways. First,
it can be characterized as a purchase of real property that is a separate
transaction from the initial loan.258 The SOJL is just as entitled to make
a profit from its investments as any third-party bidder.25 9 Other purchas-

ers at foreclosure sales could realize profits from their investments in the
properties.26 ° Yet, under the Heller Western rule, purchasing SOJLs are

denied any return whatsoever merely because they have junior security
interests; they only are permitted to recoup most of their losses. 26'
Second, the purchasing SOJL's additional cash outlay could 26
be2

characterized as an effort to protect the SOJL's original investment.

Even assuming that this characterization is consistent with the purchas-

ing SOJL's primary motivation for bidding, this characterization does
not exclude the investment characterization. Many factors may enter
253. See supra note 28 for a discussion of credit-bidding.
254. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
255. S will "credit-bid" for the full amount of the senior'debt if necessary to buy the property because the selling, or foreclosing, lienholder cannot recover a deficiency judgment after a
non-judicial foreclosure. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976). Thus, the selling
lienholder must buy the property unless another participant bids more than the amount of the
lienholder's debt if the selling lienholder wishes fully to recover the debt.
256. Note that this amount is two-and-one-third times the amount of J's initial cash outlay.
257. One hundred thousand dollars is the sum of the initial $30,000 loan and the $70,000
cash outlay.
258. This would be consistent with the perspective taken by the court in Pacific Loan Management v. Superior Court. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1987). In Pacific Loan
Management, the court referred to the SOJL's infusion of additional funds as an "investment[ ]."Id. at 1493-94, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
259. Id.; see also Dickey v. Williams, 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531
(1966) ("[D]efendant had no advantage unavailable to a stranger ....").
260. See supra note 185. This includes the selling lienholder who will make a profit without
investing any additional funds.
261. This follows from the fact that purchasing SOJLS will have their deficiency judgments
reduced by the difference between the purchase price of the property and the fair value. Heller
Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
262. Presumably, this is how the Bank ofHemet and Heller Western courts would characterize it. See Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 668-69; Heller Western, 176 Cal. App, 3d at 272-74,
221 Cal. Rptr. at 428-30.
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into an SOJL's decision to bid, or abstain from bidding, including alternative investment opportunities for the funds. Under the Heller Western
rule, a purchasing SOIL cannot recover as much as a selling lienholder
or a third party, 263 yet the purchasing SOIL must commit a substantial
amount of cash which might otherwise be invested more efficiently.
Thus, this characterization bears an unrecoverable opportunity cost to
the purchasing SOJL and society. 2 "
In light of the debtor's superior position to avoid the harm caused
by default and foreclosure,2 65 the purchasing SOJL's opportunity costs
should be borne by the debtor. Thus, the investment characterization is
more equitable. An SOIL who cannot or does not purchase the property
can still recover the initial investment by seeking a deficiency judgment
against the debtor.2 66 An SOIL who does invest additional funds to
purchase the property should be entitled to recover the debt and receive a
reasonable return on its investment.
C

The Uncertainty Problem

The major problem facing the practicing attorney is uncertainty. By
applying section 580a 267 to the SOJL, the Walter . Heller Western, Inc.
v. Bloxham2 6 and Bank of Hemet v. United States2 69 courts have clearly
construed this section beyond the plain wording of the statute and, according to most authority, beyond the intent of the California
Legislature.2 70
Statutes should always be interpreted by reference to their statutory
purposes. ' However, once the statutory purpose appears settled, and
parties have planned their affairs based upon prior courts' interpretations, social stability requires that future courts be limited by the doctrine of stare decisis:
263. See supra note 185.

264. See Schechter, supra note 218, at 132 n.89. The amount of credit available to society in
general is reduced by the funds tied up in property purchased by purchasing SOJL's at foreclosure sales. Id.
265. See Investcal Realty Corp. v. Edgar H. Mueller Constr. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 190,

197, 55 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1966) ("Investeal's security in Parcel No. 1 had been rendered
valueless through no fault of Investcal.").
266. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429. See supra notes 171-96

and accompanying text for a discussion of Heller Western.
267.
268.
269.
270.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 40, 378 P.2d 97, 99, 27 Cal. Rptr.

873, 875 (1963); see also Hetland & Hansen, supra note 56, at 213.
271. See L. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 118 (2d ed. 1985) ("Judges must satisfy themselves
that their application of a statute to the case before them serves statutory purpose.").
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When adherence to a prior interpretation or series of cases interpreting a statute promotes stability in law and this stability

in turn allows citizens to plan their affairs on the basis of certain and stable law-in short, when stability promotes the para-

mount social goal of cooperation-courts should not abandon
stare decisis

2

Thus, in light of Heller Western's belated abandonment of the rule in
RoseleafCorp. v. Chierighino,273 Heller Western's dicta that section 580a
should not be applied to a non-purchasing SOJL27 4 can offer little com-

fort to the SOJL. Just nineteen years earlier, Justice Traynor held in
Roseleafthat275section 580a would not be applied to any "non-selling jun'
ior lienors.
In support of changing precedent, proponents may argue that fair-

ness often outweighs certainty.276 This contention ignores the fact that
certainty is often a component of fairness.27 7 Moreover, even assuming
that the result in Heller Western is fair, certainty is at a premium in
secured transactions. 2 7 s Thus, courts should hesitate to change settled
272. Id. at 130.
273. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
274. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
275. Roseleaf,59 Cal. 2d at 40, 378 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Debtors probably will
make the argument that section 580a should apply to all SOJLs. For example, debtors conceivably might argue that the non-purchasing SOJL "controls" the selling price of the property
by choosing not to bid.
Furthermore, in PacificLoan Management v. SuperiorCourt, the debtor went so far as to
argue that section 580a should preclude the purchasing SOJL from recovering the surplus
from the foreclosure sale even though the surplus was the purchasing SOJL's money. 196 Cal.
App. 3d 1485, 1488, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547, 548 (1987). The trial court, in direct contravention of
the Dickey rule, agreed with the debtor: "The trial court denied the motion by an order which
recites that SBA is not entitled to the proceeds because a junior purchasing at the senior's sale
is not entitled to both the property and the satisfaction of his junior obligation." Id. at 1489,
242 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
276. For example, this argument implicitly was made by the Heller Western court. 176 Cal.
App. 3d at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429 ("[O]nce a junior chooses to purchase, it is equitable
to apply the fair value limitations to him."). Since Heller Western was the first California
court to apply section 580a to a purchasing SOJL, the parties could not have contemplated this
application of the statute at the time that the transaction occurred.
277. L. CARTER, supra note 271, at 130-31.
278. An analogy might be made to the creation of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), which deals with secured transactions in personal property. U.C.C. art. 9
(1985). The Official Comment to section 9-101 states, in part:
The growing complexity of financing transactions forced legislatures to keep piling new statutory provisions on top of our inadequate and already sufficiently complicated ... structure of security law. The results of this continuing development
were increasing costs to both parties and increasing uncertainty as to their rights and
the rights of third parties dealing with them.
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which
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secured transactions law except in the most extreme cases of inequityespecially when the law is statutorily created.2 7 9 When the legislature
amends a statute, the changes often are made effective prospectivelyallowing contracting parties to internalize the costs of those changes.2"'
However, when the courts change the law, the changes are retrospective
with respect to the parties to the action and those similarly situated.2 8 '
Thus, the purchasing SOJL in Heller Western agreed to provide the
debtor with junior financing under the good-faith belief that section 580a
would not limit a deficiency judgment after a default and foreclosure. An
SOJL who had known that the deficiency judgment would be limited
might have taken additional security or financed at a higher interest rate
to internalize the added risk.2 82 This scenario affects all the SOJLs who
had liens on real property at the time that Heller Western was decided.
The inescapable result of a sudden and unexpected increase in lending
risks is a general increase in the cost of credit.2 8 3
D. Application to Non-PurchasingJuniors:
The Future-ExpansionProblem
The next logical step in the evolution of section 580a 8 4 is its application to all SOJLs.2 s5 The potential application of this section to nonpurchasing SOJLs could give the debtor the unbridled power to wipe out
junior liens and still not be subject to deficiency judgments. This inequity
the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward
with less cost and with greater efficiency.
U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1985).
279. L. CARTER, supra note 271, at 130-31.
280. Prospective application of changes in the law provides parties with notice and an opportunity to adjust the way that they do business to compensate for those changes.
281. See, ag., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250
Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988); Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal.

Rptr. 629 (1988). Cf. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971) ("We affirm the
judgment ... on the ground that Rodrigue should not be invoked to require application of the
Louisiana time limitation retroactively to this case.").
282. See Schechter, supra note 218, at 125 n.64.
283. Id. It follows that a retroactive increase of risks to lenders requires the lenders to
overcompensate in order to internalize these new costs being applied to prior transactions.
284. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
285. Those who scoff at the possibility of a blatant overruling of Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963), might be surprised to learn that
this very proposal was made by Professor Leipziger. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 767 n.40.
Professor Leipziger proposed that section 580a be applied to all SOJLs in non-commercial
transactions, regardless of whether the SOJLs purchased the property. Id. Professor
Leipziger would not apply fair-value limitations to SOJLs in commercial transactions because
"[the SOJLs] do not have an economically realistic alternative of reinstating the defaulted
senior obligation." Id.
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would result from section 580a's three-month statute of limitations on
bringing actions for a deficiency judgment against the debtor.2 8 6 Debtors
who anticipate default could plan to default on the senior debts earlier
than necessary, while continuing to pay the SOJLs for three months following the foreclosure. The SOJLs' right to seek foreclosure remedies is
contingent upon a default by the debtor.2" 7 Thus, an SOJL's cause of
action for a deficiency judgment might not be ripe
within the statutory
288
period, resulting in a loss of the SOJL's rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

580a 289

Section
should be repealed. Applying section 580a to limit
the deficiency judgments of purchasing SOJLs is detrimental to both
SOJLs and debtors. Moreover, the application of section 580a to
purchasing SOJLs may be a precursor to further expansion of fair-value
limitations in the courts' ever-widening pursuit of antideficiency
protection.
The cases arguing that section 580a should be applied to limit the
deficiency judgment of purchasing SOJLs are plagued by analytical
problems.2 9 Pacific Loan Management v. Superior Court,2 91 the first
Court of Appeal case to consider this issue since Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham 292 ingrained this application of section 580a into
California law, was not clear in its support or disapproval of Heller Western.293 While it appears that the Pacific Loan Management court disagreed with most of the Heller Western policies,2 94 the court nonetheless
cited Heller Western with approval.2 9 Thus, purchasing SOJLs will
have their deficiency judgments limited by the fair-value provision of section 580a.2 96

Section 580a should have been explicitly repealed by the California
Legislature in 1939, when section 580d was enacted.2 97 Now that section
580a has been expanded beyond its language, it has become a dangerous
286. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
287. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 189, § 7.6.
288. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, § 4.31. SOJLs can solve this problem by including
"cross default" provisions in their loan agreements.
289. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1989).
290. See supra notes 133-222 and accompanying text.
291. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1987).
292. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
293. PacificLoan Management, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1494-95, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1495 n.3, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 553 n.3.
296. Heller Western, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
297. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976).
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instrumentality of "debtor-protectionism."

Thus, in the absence of legis-

lative action, the California Supreme Court should consider the statute's
current application.
Until section 580a is repealed, SOJLs can structure their transactions so as to avoid its impact. Section 580a does not apply to additional
or excess security.2 9 8 Additionally, in multiple security contexts, section
580a does not prohibit a deficiency judgment when the SOJL either does
not purchase one parcel, or pays the fair value for one parcel. 2 99
Unfortunately, these remedies have their costs. Over-encumbering
property prevents debtors from taking the full economic advantage of
their equity and restricts the free use of credit. 3" Furthermore, these

strategies are not certain to be successful. Given the courts' failure to
adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis in the application of section 580a,

and especially in light of the courts' misguided attempts at debtor protectionism, attorneys would be wise to tread warily in this area.3" 1
Jonathan F Golding*

298. Investcal Realty Corp. v. Edgar H. Mueller Constr. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 190, 197-98,
55 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1966); Dickey v. Williams, 240 Cal. App. 2d 270, 272, 49 Cal. Rptr.
529, 530 (1966).
299. Dickey, 240 Cal. App. 2d at 272, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
300. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
301. One commentator has already proposed that section 580a be applied to multiple security contexts, and to limit deficiencies against guarantors. Mertens, supra note 2, at 561.
* The Author wishes to thank the following attorneys for their help and encouragement:
David K. Golding, Professor Dan Schechter, Dennis B. Arnold, Paul W. Sweeney, Jr., Gary
B. Ross and Adam Siegler.
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